Obot's quickstart gave anyone on the network full admin access

What happened

Obot's documented Docker quickstart started the server on 0.0.0.0:8080 with authentication off, and with authentication off every request maps to a "nobody" user holding the Owner and Admin roles, so anyone who could reach the port had full control of the API and UI and could launch MCP servers of their choosing. Because the quickstart also mounted /var/run/docker.sock, that reached the host's Docker control surface. CVE-2026-101065, published on 27 September 2026, scores it CVSS 3.1 9.8.

The quickstart fix is to the documentation: it now enables authentication, and anyone who followed the old instructions should set OBOT_SERVER_ENABLE_AUTHENTICATION=true before exposing the host. Four code flaws published the same day are fixed in released versions: /mcp-connect ignored access-control rules before 0.21.1 (CVE-2026-101084, 9.6); unauthenticated OAuth client registration with any redirect URI could hand an attacker a victim's token before 0.23.0 (CVE-2026-101062, 8.8); an SSRF in remote MCP server registration (CVE-2026-101064, 7.6) and unauthenticated registry endpoints (CVE-2026-101063, 5.3) are also fixed in 0.23.0. CVE-2026-103758 of 1 October (8.1), a /mcp-connect-composite/ route missing from the deny list, covers 0.21.1 through 0.24.1, and Obot has since released 0.25 and 0.26.